Group signatures present a compromise between the traditional goals of digital signatures and the need for signer privacy, allowing for the creation of unforgeable signatures in the name of a group which reveal nothing about the actual signer's identity beyond their group membership. An important consideration that is absent in prevalent models is that group membership itself may be sensitive information, especially if group membership is dynamic, i.e. membership status may change over time.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of group signatures was introduced by Chaum and van Heyst in [24] . It allows a group manager to delegate signing rights to multiple signers. The group members may create publicly verifiable signatures on behalf of the entire group, such that the Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. CCS '19, November 11-15, 2019 , London, United Kingdom © 2019 Association for Computing Machinery. ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6747-9/19/11. . . $15.00 https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3354257 signature does not reveal the identity of the actual signer beyond their membership in the group. A designated opening authority has the ability to verifiably reveal the actual signer of a particular signature, in case of abuse. Ideal applications of group signatures are, for instance, business processes, where responsibility for certain actions should be shared among the members of one level of management by creating a signature, but accountability is preserved via the possibility of after-the-fact opening of a signature through a supervisory board.
In applications, which enforce public accountability of group members via the signature mechanism, it is essential that the public knows who is part of the group. We consider the idea that in some applications it is equally essential that group membership is not disclosed and cannot be associated with the user's global identity (e.g. represented by a public key), i.e. that the scheme provides an additional property called: membership privacy. In some cases leakage of membership information may have negative effects on the users. In particular, membership in controversial groups may lead to persecution, e.g. loss of job because of personal interests, beliefs or affiliation. Membership privacy is also advantageous if group signatures are used for access control to sensitive resources. Imagine, e.g., cities that provide free access to charging stations for electric cars to their inhabitants, but not to non-inhabitants. Group signatures offer a simple, privacy-preserving solution for access control in this case, since the charging station only has to verify that the user is an inhabitant of the city, represented by a group managed by the city government. However, using a non-private group signature scheme to implement this incurs a privacy leak, since cities would have to publish lists of their inhabitants and it could easily be tracked if and where people are moving between cities. In more involved scenarios, in the context of delegatable anonymous credentials [8, 23, 26] , a membership private group signature scheme could be used to enforce confidentiality between members at different levels of delegation. What is more, since users can enroll the same public key in several groups-not all of which necessarily having the same privacy requirements-membership privacy reduces risk of identity disclosure by avoiding the overhead of managing a distinct pseudonymous identities for groups where privacy is required. 1 
Formal Models of Group Signatures
The first formal security model, called the static model, was given by Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi (BMW) in [10] , who also provided a construction from general assumptions.
Later models, notably the ones due to Bellare, Shi, and Zhang (BSZ) [11] , as well as Kiayias, and Yung (KY) [40, 41] , which will be subsumed under the term (partially) dynamic models, generalize the static model in terms of functionality as well as security considerations:
• The dynamic models split the group manager-previously entrusted with user key generation and opening-in separate issuing and opening authorities, allowing stronger security notions, which consider malicious behaviour on the part of either. • The static model requires all potential group members to be known at setup time, the dynamic models allow dynamic enrollment after group creation via a join/issue protocol, where users jointly generate their signing keys in interaction with the authorities.
In the dynamic models, it has to be ensured that the opening is performed honestly. Otherwise a malicious opener or a malicious member of the group could produce a dishonest opening that identifies a wrong signer, either to claim a specific signatures for themselves, or blame a user for a signature which they did not create. Sakai et al. [47] thus define a notion called opening soundness, which, if achieved, ensures that it is infeasible to create an opening which points to any but the actual signer of a valid signature.
A further extension of the dynamic models was recently proposed by Bootle et al. [17] . Their model, which we subsequently call the fully dynamic model, additionally addresses revocation of group membership, incorporates opening soundness and considers security even under maliciously generated keys. To model the dynamic nature of addition and revocation of members, the scheme's lifetime is divided into a series of epochs such that changes in the group membership require advancing the scheme to the next epoch. Since the issuing authority decides who may join the group and who has to leave, the group's public information is updated by the issuing authority for each new epoch. The authors show that their model is general enough to capture previous notions, making it the most expressive model of the security of group signatures to date.
A related property to our membership privacy was conceived for the partially dynamic setting by Kiayias and Zhou in Hidden Identity-Based Signatures [42] and efficiently instantiated by Chow et al. [25] . In these works, group membership lists are avoided altogether, enabling to hide the identity of group members even from the opening authority. We stress that in the fully dynamic model some form group membership list is necessary to implement membership revocation, separating these approaches from ours.
Related Work. Generic constructions of group signatures from [10] and [11] established the widely used sign-and-encrypt-and-prove paradigm (SEP) design paradigm: A signature consists of an encryption under the opener's public key of both a members's signature on the message and the member's identity, as well as a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that the encrypted identity-typically a signature issued by the group manager-is valid that of the signer of the message. Thus, relying on the unforgeability of this signature, such a group signature scheme achieves non-frameability and traceability. Abdalla and Warinschi proved in [1] that group signatures are actually equivalent to IND-CPA secure encryption schemes.
In [12] , Bichsel et al. identify the SEP design paradigm as a source of inefficiency in group signatures. They propose a new approach based on re-randomizable signature schemes and provide an efficient construction without encryption secure in the random oracle model. In our paper we follow that idea, however we do not rely on the random oracle model to prove security of our scheme. Many group signature schemes were designed for both the static and dynamic case in the random oracle model which utilize the RSA cryptosystem [3, 21, 39, 48] , discrete logarithm setting [4, 32] , and bilinear setting [13, 22] .
One of the first standard model constructions, i.e. without random oracles (cf. [45] ), was introduced by Ateniese et al. [2] in the bilinear setting. The scheme is highly efficient, with signature consisting of only 8 group elements. However, it does not provide full-anonymity in the BMW model [10] . In particular, the adversary is not allowed to see the private keys of honest users.
Boyen and Waters [19, 20] proposed standard model schemes that use composite order bilinear groups, but in contrast to [2] allow key exposure attacks, albeit without allowing the adversary to see any openings of signatures. This restricted version of fullanonymity is also called CPA-anonymity.
The introduction of the Groth-Sahai (GS) proof system [36] allowed for the design of new and efficient group signature schemes in the standard model. Groth [35] was the first to introduce a standard model group signature with constant size public key and signatures, which preserve the full-anonymity property under a q-type assumption. The GS proof system was also used by Libert et al. [43, 44] , who designed standard model group signatures with revocation capabilities.
At Crypto' 15 Libert, Peters and Yung [45] introduced two efficient group signature schemes that rely on simple assumptions, the first scheme secure in the static BMW model [10] , the second construction less efficient, but secure in the dynamic security model from [41] .
Bootle et al. [18] propose a generic construction of group signatures from accountable ring signatures. They instantiate it using a scheme based on a sigma protocol in the random oracle model. Later, Bootle et al. [17] show that this construction is a fully dynamic group signature scheme. The idea is to include the description of the ring as part of the epoch information. This way only users in the ring are member of the group in the current epoch. Security follows directly from the security of accountable ring signatures.
Derler and Slamanig proposed a generic construction for dynamic group signatures based on structure preserving signatures on equivalence classes (SPS-EQ) [28] . SPS-EQ define a relation R that induces a partition on the message space. By signing one representative of a partition, the signer in fact signs the whole partition. Then, without knowledge of the secret key we can transform the signature to a different representative of the partition. Their group signatures make use of signatures of knowledge (as part of the group signature) and non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems (in the issuing procedure and to ensure opening soundness). The authors present an efficient instantiation in the random oracle model. There currently exists no standard model instantiation.
Recently, Backes et al. [5] introduced a new cryptographic primitive called signatures with flexible public key. The idea is similar to SPS-EQ, but instead of partitioning the message space, the partition is on the public key space. In other words, signers can randomize their public key and secret key to a different representative of the same equivalence class and create a signature that is valid under the new public key. The authors also show how to combine their primitive with SPS-EQ to construct static group signatures, which are secure in the BMW model [10] .
Group signatures can also be constructed from lattice-based assumptions [46] or symmetric primitives [14] . The former is the only scheme secure under lattice-based assumptions for which the signature size does not depend on the number of group members. Unfortunately, it is only secure in the partially dynamic model [11] and in the random oracle model. The latter scheme is also instantiated in the random oracle model.
Our Contribution in Detail
In this paper we revisit the fully-dynamic group signature framework by Bootle et al. [17] . We observe that the epoch information published with each modification of the group (joining or leaving of a member) may leak the identities of members. For instance in the scheme proposed in [18] , where the epoch information contains a list of active members, this information is required to verify a signature. This is a major issue that limits the applications of group signatures and introduces real-world privacy risks that are not captured by the security model. In particular, let us consider the use of group signatures as part of a corporate/governmental access control system to resources. In such a scenario group signatures protect access patterns between mutually rival departments. On the other hand, leaking a list of active members of the group can be used potential adversaries to perform targetted attacks, e.g. bribery attempts, phishing attacks on private emails or denial of service attacks. An application that was impossible using previous definitions are private groups that can be used to create an electronic authentication method for private club members. Members of the club are unknown to the public and other members of the club but the group signatures allows a way to prove membership if required.
Therefore, as our first contribution, we propose a new security notion for fully dynamic group signatures, namely membership privacy. Informally, when a group signature scheme offers membership privacy it means that an external observer cannot tell who joined or left the group in a given epoch, even if a subset of the group's members is controlled by the observer. 2 The possibility of membership privacy changes the meaning of a group signature to the external public compared to the previous models. The public may still verify that the signature was created by a party which received signing capabilities from the issuing authority, but not only is there no indication who the signer was specifically, but even the group of potential signers is hidden. As a consequence, to an external observer, the group signature scheme is a way for the issuing authority to dynamically delegate signing capabilities to anonymous signers, who can be held privately accountable by the opening authority. In extending the model of Bootle et al. [17] we give formal definitions of join and leave privacy, which taken together constitute membership privacy in the most expressive model of group signature security to date.
Our second contribution is a generic construction of fully-dynamic group signatures with membership privacy. Our scheme is built upon novel techniques in the area of signatures with flexible public keys (SFPK) and their fruitful combination with signatures on equivalence classes (SPS-EQ). The former primitive allows signing keys to be re-randomized within a system of equivalence classes, while the second allows the same for messages and signatures. We build upon the idea, introduced in [5] , of using the combination of SFPK and SPS-EQ schemes with compatible systems of equivalence classes to construct highly efficient privacy-preserving signature schemes. Each epoch the group manager uses a fresh instance of SPS-EQ to certify the public signing keys of members, which live in SFPK equivalence classes. However, instead of certifying the original keys in the epoch information, the group manager randomizes the public signing key and encrypts the randomization using the signer's public encryption key. Members can decrypt the randomization and use the SPS-EQ signature from the epoch information. Additionally, the signer creates a proof of knowledge of a unique representative of the equivalence class and the randomness used by the signer. This unique representative can be extracted by the tracing authority and used to identify the signer because the unique representative is also used as the signer's global public key. Membership privacy is ensured because the group manager randomizes the published public key list.
Lastly we show how to optimize our generic construction and efficiently instantiate it under standard assumptions without relying on the random oracle model. The resulting scheme has shorter signatures than state-of-the-art schemes [36, 45] that are secure in the same setting but only allow for partially-dynamic groups. To achieve this efficiency we introduce a new SFPK scheme that has an optimal public key size of 2 group elements in G 1 . The scheme is secure under the bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in G 1 . The technique that makes our instantiation of group signatures possible is a notion called canonical representative. Informally, we define a unique representative for every equivalence class, which allows us to identify the class without the use of any additional trapdoor. In the previous definition by Backes et al. [5] the only way to identify a class was by using a trapdoor created during key generation, which hinders all applications where keys have to be secret but identifying classes has to be done publicly. We summarize our results as follows:
(1) We extend the definitions of Bootle et al. [17] and show that membership privacy can be seamlessly integrated in the previous security models for fully dynamic group signatures. (2) We devise a generic construction of fully dynamic group signatures with membership privacy that can be instantiated in the standard model. (3) We devise a novel technique for the conjunction of SFPK and SPS-EQ, allowing us to build a highly efficient standard model group signature schemes along the lines of our generic construction, but with shorter signature size than even stateof-the-art non-private schemes with comparable assumption. This underlines that membership privacy need not come at additional cost.
PRELIMINARIES
Notation. We denote by y ← $ A(x) the execution of algorithm A on input x and with output y. By r ← $ S we mean that r is chosen uniformly at random over the set S. We will use 1 G to denote the identity element in group G, [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}, and ì u to denote a vector. Finally, by A O we denote an algorithm A that has access to oracle O. When the number of oracles is large we will also write A O 1 , ..., ..., O n to denote access to oracles O 1 , . . . , O n .
We write Exp ϕ A, Ψ (1 λ ) ⇒ 1 for the event that the experiment Exp returns 1, when instantiated with parameters ϕ, adversary A and primitive Ψ, all of which possibly omitted. We define the adjusted advantage of adversary A in this experiment as
Signatures on Equivalence Classes
We now recall the notion of signatures on equivalence classes (SPS-EQ) introduced by Hanser and Slamanig [37] . The signing algorithm SPS.Sign(sk SPS , ì M) defines an equivalence relation R that induces a partition on the message space. A signer can simply sign one representative of the class to create a signature for the whole class. The signature can then be changed without the knowledge of the secret key to a different representative using the SPS.ChgRep(pk SPS , M, σ SPS , r ) algorithm. Existing instantiations work in the bilinear group setting and allow to sign messages from the space G * ℓ i , for ℓ > 1. The partition on the message space in those schemes is induced by the relation R exp : given two messages ì M, ì M ′ ∈ G * ℓ i , we say that M and M ′ are from the same equivalence class (denoted by [ ì M] R ) if there exists a scalar r ∈ Z * p , such that for all i ∈ [ℓ] it holds M r i = M ′ i . In terms of security, Hanser and Slamanig [37] define notions of unforgeability under chosen-message attacks and class-hiding. Fuchsbauer and Gay [31] introduce a relaxed notion, unforgeability under chosen-open-message attacks, which restricts the adversaries' signing queries to messages of which it knows all exponents. Definition 2.1 (EUF-{CMA, CoMA}). For SPS-EQ scheme SPS = (BGGen, KGen, Sign, ChgRep, Verify, VKey) on G * ℓ i we define the following experiments, parameterized in the given signing oracle:
(sk SPS , pk SPS ) ← $ SPS.KGen(BG, ℓ); 
Signatures with Flexible Public Key
In our group signature construction we use a primitive called signatures with flexible public keys (SFPK), that was recently introduced by Backes et al. [5] and which we extend by the notion of canonical representatives (or canonical form).
In SFPK the public key space is partitioned into equivalence classes induced by a relation R. A signer can efficiently generate (sk, pk) ← $ SFPK.KGen(1 λ ) and change her key pair to a different representative of the same class via two algorithms pk ′ ← $ SFPK.ChgPK(pk, r ) for the public key and sk ′ ← $ SFPK.ChgSK(sk, r ) for the secret key, which take the same randomness r ← $ coin. The randomized secret key can be used to sign a message Sig ← $ SFPK.Sign(sk ′ , m), such that the signature can be verified by running SFPK.Verify(pk ′ , m, Sig). Class-hiding ensures that, without a trapdoor, it is hard to distinguish if two public keys are related, i.e. in the same equivalence class. If a key pair has been generated along a trapdoor δ using (sk, pk, δ ) ← $ SFPK.TKGen(1 λ ), then given the trapdoor one can run 0/1 ← SFPK.ChkRep(δ, pk ′ ) to check if pk ′ is in relation to pk. The original definition by Backes et al. uses a strong corruption model, where the adversary is given the random coins used to generate the challenged keys. We will show that in our construction a slightly weaker model, where the adversary gets only the secret keys, is sufficient. We will define this scheme in the multi-user setting, i.e. with a setup algorithm SFPK.CRSGen(1 λ ) that outputs a common reference string ρ. We only consider a scenario in which this setup has to be executed by a trusted party in order for the scheme to be unforgeable. Note that this means that the secrets used to generate the CRS can be used to forge signatures. This kind of trapdoor δ ρ was not specified in [5] , but we will use it in the security proof of our group signature scheme. In other words, this means there is an alternative signing algorithm SFPK.Sign(δ ρ , pk, m), which outputs valid signatures for the relation class [pk] R , without knowledge of the corresponding secret key sk. SFPK.CRSGen(1 λ ): on input a security parameter 1 λ , outputs a trapdoor δ ρ and a common reference string ρ, which is an implicit input for all the algorithms. SFPK.KGen(1 λ , ω): on input a security parameter 1 λ and random coins ω ∈ coin, outputs a pair (sk, pk) of secret and public keys. SFPK.TKGen(1 λ , ω): on input a security parameter 1 λ and random coins ω ∈ coin, outputs a pair (sk, pk) of secret and public keys, and a trapdoor δ . SFPK.Sign(sk, m): on input a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and a signing key sk, outputs a signature Sig. SFPK.ChkRep(δ, pk ′ ): on input a trapdoor δ for some equivalence class [pk] R and public key pk ′ , outputs 1 if pk ′ ∈ [pk] R and 0 otherwise. SFPK.ChgPK(pk, r ): on input a representative pk of equivalence class [pk] R and random coins r , outputs a different representative pk ′ , where pk ′ ∈ [pk] R . SFPK.ChgSK(sk, r ): on input a secret key sk and random coins r , outputs an updated secret key sk ′ . SFPK.Verify(pk, m, Sig): on input a message m, signature Sig and public verification key pk, outputs 1 if the signature is valid and 0 otherwise.
To simplify notation we write (sk ′ , pk ′ ) ← SFPK.ChgKeys(sk, pk, r ) as shorthand for the joint randomization of secret and public keys using the same r . Definition 2.4 (Correctness). We say that a SFPK scheme is correct if for all 1 λ ∈ N, all random coins ω, r ∈ coin the following conditions hold:
(1) The key pairs output by SFPK.KGen and SFPK.TKGen are identically distributed.
(2) For all key pairs (sk, pk) ← $ SFPK.KGen(1 λ , ω) and all messages m we have SFPK.Verify(pk, m, SFPK.Sign(sk, m)) = 1 and SFPK.Verify(pk ′ , m, SFPK.Sign(sk ′ , m)) = 1, where (sk ′ , pk ′ ) ← SFPK.ChgKeys(sk, pk, r ).
(3) For all (sk, pk, δ ) ← $ SFPK.TKGen(1 λ , ω) and all pk ′ we have SFPK.ChkRep(δ, pk ′ ) = 1 if and only if pk ′ ∈ [pk] R .
Definition 2.5 (Class-hiding with Key Corruption). For scheme SFPK with relation R and adversary A we define the following experiment:
A SFPK is class-hiding with key corruption if for all PPT adversaries A, their adjusted advantage Adv 1
Definition 2.6 (Strong Existential Unforgeability under Flexible Public Key). For scheme SFPK with relation R and adversary A we define the following experiment:
A SFPK is existentially unforgeable with flexible public key under chosen message attacks if for all PPT adversaries A, their advantage
Canonical Representatives. It might be the case that every public key equivalence class has a unique representative which can act as a description of the class. We will call such objects the canonical representatives of the given classes and further assume that if a scheme has canonical representatives, there is an efficient predicate IsCanonical which on input a public key will return 1 if and only if the public key is canonical. We will use this type of public key and representative later in the optimized variant of our scheme.
Definition 2.7 (SPS-EQ/SFPK Compatibility). An SPS-EQ scheme and an SFPK scheme are compatible if the message space of the former is the same as the key space of the latter and they share the same equivalence relation.
Additional Preliminaries
In the following sections, we make use of a number of well-known cryptographic primitives, including programmable hash functions, digital signature schemes, key-private public key encryption, as well as efficient non-interactive proof systems. The instantiations of our constructions are in the bilinear setting, i.e. in the presence of a bilinear group generation algorithm BG and we prove security under the standard decisional Diffie-Hellman and and bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumptions, relative to BG respectively. Definition 2.8 (Bilinear map). Let us consider cyclic groups G 1 , G 2 , G T of prime order p. Let д 1 , д 2 be generators of respectively G 1 and G 2 . We call e : G 1 × G 2 → G T a bilinear map (pairing) if it is efficiently computable and the following holds:
Depending on the choice of groups we say that map e is of type 1 if G 1 = G 2 , of type 2 if G 1 G 2 and there exists an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ :
Definition 2.9 (Bilinear-group generator). A bilinear-group generator is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm BGGen that on input a security parameter 1 λ returns a bilinear group BG = (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, д 1 , д 2 ) such that G 1 = ⟨д 1 ⟩, G 2 = ⟨д 2 ⟩ and G T are groups of order p and e : G 1 × G 2 → G T is a bilinear map.
Assumptions
Definition 2.10 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption in G i ).
We will use Adv ddh A (λ) to denote the advantage of the adversary in solving this problem.
If the instance were given in both groups, i.e. (д a
then the pairing would allow to efficiently check e(д a 1 , д b 2 ) = e(д z 1 , д 2 ). An analogous problem, which is assumed difficult even in the presence of a pairing is given by adding values д c 1 , д c 2 to the challenge and asking whether z = a ·b ·c mod p. This was noted by Boneh and Franklin [15] who defined a similar problem called Weil decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in the type 1 setting. In their later work [16] it was renamed to bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. We restate it for type 3 pairings as follows:
We will use Adv bddh A (λ) to denote the advantage of the adversary in solving this problem.
Definition 2.12 (Collision-Resistance). We call a hash function H :
We will use Adv coll A (λ) to denote the advantage of the adversary in finding a collision for this hash function.
Programmable Hash Functions
We now recall the definition of programmable hash functions introduced by Hofheinz and Kiltz [38] . We first define a group hash function for group G and output length ℓ = ℓ(λ) as consisting of two polynomial time algorithms PHF.Gen and PHF.Eval. For a security parameter λ, the generation algorithm K PHF ← $ PHF.Gen(1 λ ) outputs a key. This key can be used to deterministically evaluate the hash function via y ∈ G ← PHF.Eval(K PHF , X ), where X ∈ {0, 1} ℓ . Definition 2.13. A group hash function (PHF.Gen, PHF.Eval) is an (m, n, γ , δ )-programmable hash function if there are polynomial time algorithms PHF.TrapGen and PHF.TrapEval such that:
• For any д, h ∈ G the (K ′ PHF , td) ← $ PHF.TrapGen(1 λ , д, h) outputs a key K ′ and trapdoor td. Then, for every
• For all д, h ∈ G and all possible keys K ′ PHF from the range of PHF.TrapGen(1 λ , д, h), for all X 1 , . . . , X m , Z 1 , . . . , Z n ∈ {0, 1} ℓ such that X i Z j for any i, j and for the correspond-
where the probability is over the trapdoor td that was produced along with key K ′ PHF .
Hofheinz and Kiltz show that the function introduced by Waters [49] is a programmable hash function. For a key K PHF = (h 0 , . . . , h ℓ ) ∈ G ℓ+1 and message X = (x 1 , . . . ,
In particular, they prove that for any fixed q = q(λ) it is a (1, q, 0, 1/8 · (ℓ + 1) · q)-programmable hash function.
Non-Interactive Proof Systems
Let R be an efficiently computable binary relation, where for (x, w) ∈ R we call x a statement and w a witness. Moreover, we will denote by L R the language consisting of statements in R, i.e.
Definition 2.14 (Non-Interactive Proof System). A non-interactive proof system Π consists of the following three algorithms:
Setup(1 λ ): on input security parameter 1 λ , outputs a common reference string ρ. Prove(ρ, x, w): on input common reference string ρ, statement
x and witness w, outputs a proof π . Verify(ρ, x, π ): on input common reference string ρ, statement
x and proof π , outputs either accept(1) or reject(0).
Some proof systems do not need a common reference string. In such a case, we omit the first argument to Π.Prove and Π.Verify.
Definition 2.15 (Soundness). A proof system Π is called sound, if for all PPT algorithms A the following probability, denoted by Adv sound Π, A (λ), is negligible in the security parameter 1 λ :
where the probability is taken over the randomness used by Π.Setup and the adversary A. We say that the proof system is perfectly sound if Adv sound Π, A (λ) = 0.
Definition 2.16 (Witness Indistinguishability (WI)). A proof system Π is witness indistinguishable, if for all PPT algorithms A we have that the advantage Adv wi Π, A (λ) computed as:
where (x, w 0 ), (x, w 1 ) ∈ R, is at most negligible in λ. We say that the proof system if perfectly witness indistinguishable if Adv wi Π, A (λ) = 0.
Definition 2.17 (Zero-Knowledge). A proof system Π is called zeroknowledge, if there exists a PPT simulator S = (SimGen, Sim) such that for all PPT algorithms A the following probability, denoted by Adv zk Π, A (λ), is negligible in the security parameter 1 λ :
where τ is a trapdoor information, oracle call S(ρ, τ , x, w) returns the output of Sim(ρ, τ , x) for (x, w) ∈ R and both oracles output ⊥ if (x, w) R.
Definition 2.18 (Simulation Sound Extractability). A proof system Π is called simulation sound, if there exists a knowledge extractor E = (ExtGen, Extract) and simulator S = Sim, such that for all algorithms A
is negligible in λ, where Q is a list of simulation queries and responses (x i , π i ) of Sim and (ρ, τ ) is identical to the output of SimGen from the definition of zero-knowledge.
Digital Signatures and Public Key Encryption
In our group signature construction we also make use of standard digital signatures and public key encryption schemes. We use (DS.KGen, DS.Sign, DS.Verify) to denote the algorithms that make up the scheme DS and Adv euf−cma A,DS (λ) to denote the adversaries' advantage against existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks of the signature scheme.
A public key encryption scheme PKE consists of three algorithms (PKE.KeyGen, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec). We use the standard notion of indistinguishability of ciphertexts under chosen message attacks (IND − CPA) as well as the notion of key privacy under chosen message attacks (IK − CPA), which informally requires that it is infeasible for an attacker to determine which key was used to create a given ciphertext even if with access to both encryption keys. A full formal definition of this property can be found in [9] . An example of a scheme which achieves key privacy is the El Gamal encryption scheme [33] . Finally, we will use ⇌ to denote the relation between the secret key and the corresponding public key. Note that for many schemes, like e.g. El Gamal, this relation can be easily checked and proven.
FULLY DYNAMIC GROUP SIGNATURES
We recall the framework of definitions for fully dynamic group signatures established in [17] . ) where uid > 0 identifies the user-ID of the group member who produced the signature and π is a proof of this fact. If tracing is not successful the algorithm will output a pair (0, π ) indicating the failure via the special user-ID 0, which is not assigned to any regular user. GS.Judge(gpk, uid, info τ , π Trace , ì upk[uid], m, Σ): Given a signature for epoch τ , the corresponding group information and a tracing output (uid, π ), anyone in possession of the group public key can deterministically judge the validity of π w.r.t. to the statement, that Σ was created using ì дsk [uid] , in which case the algorithm outputs accept, otherwise reject.
Security Definitions
We recall from [17] the correctness and security definitions for FDGS (cf. Figure 1) .
Correctness.
A malicious user may not undermine the correctness of the scheme. This includes unforgeability of the scheme. Anonymity. Given a signature, it is infeasible, without a secret trapdoor information, to distinguish which signer created it. Traceability. No coalition of group members and the opening authority can produce a signature which opens to an invalid identity or an identity that was not active in the signing epoch. Functional Tracing Soundness. A further property defined in [17] is tracing or opening soundness: Even if all parties in the group collude, they cannot produce a valid signature that traces to two different members.
A subtle point arises in the definition of tracing soundness, namely how is the uniqueness of group members established? If the adversary controls several users, they may share the same public key, hence their signatures cannot be distinguished by an opening which reveals the public key of the signer. Because of this, the opening instead leads to a specific user identity, i.e. an entry in the public registration table. This has two-fold consequences: 1) The user registration table has to be public, otherwise the opening is meaningless. 2) To verify an opening or a signature, it has to be verified as well that the group at the time of the creation of the signature was well-formed, i.e. every member occupies exactly one slot in the registration table.
We propose a relaxation of this notion, which allows us to avoid these implications. Our notion, functional tracing soundness distinguishes members by their public keys, i.e. it should not be possible, even in a fully corrupted group to create a valid signature and two openings for it which indicate conflicting public keys. The modifications to the tracing soundness experiment which implement this change are highlighted .
We observe that the FDGS scheme based on accountable ring signatures presented in [17] adheres to this definition already, since its proof of tracing soundness relies on the tracing soundness of the underlying accountable ring signature scheme. The property for accountable ring signature schemes requires that the verification keys provided in the two openings be different.
Note that the construction of FDGS presented later in this work can be made to achieve the original version of tracing soundness, albeit at the cost of the above mentioned group integrity checks and any kind of group membership privacy. Definition 3.6 (Functional Tracing Soundness). For a FDGS scheme GS we define the following experiment: The formal description of the given oracles can be found in the full version of this paper. Informally, they serve the following functions:
AddU ( In addition, the challenger keeps track of the active members of the group. We assume it has access to an algorithm GS.IsActive as follows.
GS.IsActive(info τ , ì reд, uid) : Given a group information for epoch τ , a registration table ì reд and a user-ID uid, outputs 1 if uid is a non-revoked member of the group in that epoch, 0 otherwise.
Leave-Join Privacy for FDGS
Formal models of dynamic group signatures thus far implicitly assumed that the public is aware who is a member of the group. Usually, a registration table is published, such that the entries are bound to public keys of the members. This is in line with one of the main application of group signatures: authenticating messages with the authority of a known group, certifying that an indeterminate someone within the group has seen the signed message and taken responsibility on behalf of the group.
In their seminal work Chaum and van Heyst [24] , however, did not specify this as an essential requirement. In fact, they point out that group signatures can be used for access control, where knowing members of the group is an obvious privacy leak that could for instance lead to targeted DoS attacks on the group. Therefore it seems natural that in some applications we want to hide the identities of active group members.
To address this issue we discuss for the first time membership privacy for fully dynamic group signatures. Informally, we will say that a group signature scheme has membership privacy if it protects the identity of users that join or leave the system. This means that we consider a scenario in which some kind of public identifier about users is known independently of the scheme (e.g. public key) but it is unknown to a third party who is part of the group. Moreover, we assume that some users can be corrupted or can collude to infer information about the membership status of other users.
To formally define this notion, we propose a pair of security experiments which are expressed in the fully dynamic framework put forth by [17] . However, one can easily specify similar experiments 
AddU,RevealU,CrptU,SndToM, Sign,Trace,Revoke for the partially dynamic models [11, 40, 41 ]. The first one describes join privacy, since it considers the case that two non-members are known in one epoch and in the next epoch one of them joins the system and the task is to distinguish who joined the group. The second experiment describes leave privacy and models the case that there are two known members in one epoch and in the next epoch one of them leaves the group. Note that this assumes that the adversary knows out of band that the two users had previously joined the group. 3 In both cases we allow an adversary to corrupt members of the group but we consider both authorities to be honest: The issuing authority always knows who is part of the group and the tracing authority can open all signatures to extract the identities of members. In particular, this implies that the registration table ì reд may not be public because one could easily infer current members from it. Fortunately, this seems a fairly natural assumption. This registration table is not necessary in any of the user-run algorithms and it is easier to keep it local to the authorities than publishing it online. An exception is the scheme [47] mentioned above, where the registration table is part of the verification algorithm to ensure that tracing soundness holds with respect to public user identities rather than in the functional sense we describe.
We formally define join and leave privacy in terms of the two experiments shown in Figure 2 . Note, that we introduce a new set of privacy challenge users H * . In the two experiments, H * is used to restrict the function of oracles which would allow trivial success for the adversary:
• The privacy challenge users may not be removed from the group, i.e. Revoke returns ⊥ if S ∩ H * ∅. This is because GS.RevokeMember is defined to return ⊥ if the group information does not change as result of the revocation, which would be the case if the user was already removed from the group. • The privacy challenge users may not be corrupted or have their keys revealed. Note, that this also prevents an adversary from re-enrolling a challenge user by initiating a join-issue session for them.
• The signing oracle treats signature requests for user IDs in the privacy challenge set differently. In the case of join privacy, a signature request for any privacy challenge user, i.e. uid 0 or uid 1 will be treated like a signature request for user uid b who joined the system. In the case of leave privacy, it will be treated like a signature request for user uid (1−b) who did not leave the group. Additionally, the queries will be added to the set of challenge queries Q * , which prevents the adversary from using the Trace oracle to produce an opening for them. Remark 1. Note that leave privacy as stated above only seems to ensure privacy, when a single user leaves the group, however, the GS.RevokeMember algorithm allows simultaneous membership revocation for a whole set of users S. However, a simple hybrid argument should suffice to extend the property from one revocation to many revocations.
OUR CONSTRUCTION
In this section we formalize the group signature proposed in the introduction. We present the full algorithms in Figure 3 . The idea of our construction is as follows. The issuer uses signatures on equivalence classes to certify group members' SFPK public keys 4 . As already noted by Backes et al. [5] this forms self-blindable certificates, i.e. each member can randomize the certificate and their public key which is computationally indistinguishable from the original public key used during the issuing procedure. To add and revoke members, each epoch the issuer generates a new SPS-EQ keypair and puts the public key in the epoch information. To prevent malicious epoch information, the issuer signs the SPS-EQ public key using a standard digital signature scheme. To protect the identities of members, the issuer does not directly publish the new certificates but uses a randomization, i.e. certificates for public keys that are in relation to keys of members. To allow the members to restore the right certificate, the issuer encrypts the random coins that can be used to restore the original certificate. The encryption is done under the members encryption key. What is more, key-privacy ensures that the ciphertexts do not leak the identities. Note, that the join/issue session in our construction is non-interactive in the sense that the group manager can add members to the group given only their user public key, hence the GS.Join algorithm is trivial.
To enable tracing we use the canonical representative of SFPK, i.e. a signer encrypts their canonical representative under the tracing authority public key and uses proof system Π GS.Trace to prove in statement x Sign that the randomized SFPK public key is in relation to this encrypted key. The complete group signature is composed of a randomized SPS-EQ certificate from the issuer on the randomized SFPK public key of the member, a ciphertext of the canonical representative, a proof that this ciphertext is sound and a SFPK signature on all those values and the message.
Finally, the proof system Π GS.Judge is used by the tracing authority to prove in statement x Trace that the decrypted public key corresponds to public keys used during the issuing procedure. Theorem 1 (Join Privacy). Our construction has private joins if the encryption scheme used by the signers is IND − CPA secure and has IK − CPA key privacy and the SFPK scheme is adaptively class hiding with key corruption.
Proof. We consider a series of games. In the following let uid b be the challenge user who is inserted into the group and let gpk[uid b ] = (pk SFPK , pk Enc ) be their public key and ì дsk[uid b ] = (sk SFPK , sk Enc ) be their secret key. Let S i denote the event that the adversary wins in GAME i . Putting it all together we thus have □ Theorem 2 (Leave Privacy). Our construction has leave privacy if the encryption scheme used by the signers is IND − CPA secure and has IK − CPA key privacy and the SFPK scheme is adaptively class hiding with key corruption.
Proof. This proof follows similar steps as the proof for join privacy. We consider a series of games, where in the first game b is fixed to 0 and in the last game, b is fixed to 1. Let S i denote the event that A's final output in GAME i is 0. GAME 0 The Leave − Privacy game, where bit b is fixed to 0. GAME 3 We change the SFPK public key to the public key of uid 1 , also changing the signatures in PrivChall to this secret key. The game is now the same as the Leave − Privacy game with the bit fixed to 1. Because of adaptive class hiding we have |Pr[S 2 ] − Pr[S 3 ]| ≤ Adv c-h A,SFPK (λ). □ Theorem 3 (Anonymity). Our construction is anonymous if the SPS-EQ signature scheme perfectly adapts signatures, the SFPK scheme is adaptively class-hiding with key corruption and strongly existential unforgeable, the proof system used by signers is witness-indistinguishable and the proof system used by the tracing authority is zero-knowledge. GS.RevokeMember(gpk, msk, info τ cur r ent , S, ì reд) msk = (sk DS , sk SPS ) (sk ′ SPS , pk ′ SPS ) ← $ SPS.KGen(BG, 2) msk := (sk DS , sk ′ SPS ) infoτ cur r ent = (·, ·, Active); A := {i | user i is active}
return infoτ new = (pk ′ SPS , DS.Sign(sk DS , pk ′ SPS ), Active ′ ) Figure 3 : Our generic construction of fully dynamic group signatures.
Proof. We will use the game base approach. Let us denote by S i the event that the adversary wins the anonymity experiment in GAME i . Moreover, let n be the number of queries to the AddU oracle made by the adversary and let (info * τ , uid * 1 , uid * 2 , m * ) be the query made to the Chall b oracle, which outputs Σ * = (pk * SFPK , σ * SPS , Π * SFPK , c * SFPK , Sig * SFPK ). GAME 1 : We simulate the proof generated in GS.Trace by the tracing authority.
Obviously, we only lower the advantage of the adversary by a negligible fraction because of the zero-knowledge property of this proof. Thus, we have |Pr[S 1 ] − Pr[S 0 ]| ≤ Adv zk A, Π GS.Judge (λ). GAME 2 : We change the way the Trace oracle works. Instead of using tsk to decrypt pk SFPK from c SFPK , we first extract the witness (pk SFPK , r ) and use pk SFPK instead. What is more, we simulate the proof Π * SFPK , which is part of the challenges signature.
Note that since the proof system Π GS.Trace is simulation-sound extractable it follows that |Pr[S 2 ] − Pr[S 1 ]| ≤ Adv sse A, Π GS.Trace (λ). GAME 3 : We change the way the ciphertext c * SFPK is computed. Instead of encrypting the canonical representative, we encrypt the value 0.
Note that because of the changes made in the previous game, the Trace oracle works as in GAME 2 . Thus, we have that |Pr[S 3 ] − Pr[S 2 ]| ≤ Adv ind−cpa PKE, A (λ) GAME 4 : We now change the way we compute σ * SPS . Instead of using the SPS.ChgRep algorithm to change representation of an old signature, we compute the SPS-EQ signature directly on pk * SFPK .
Since the SPS-EQ signature scheme perfectly adapts signatures, we have Pr[S 4 ] = Pr[S 3 ] GAME 5 : Given the experiments bit b, we choose index i ← $ [n] and abort if uid b does not correspond to the user created in the i-th query of the adversary to AddU.
We have Pr[S 4 ] = n · Pr[S 5 ]. GAME 6 : Let pk SFPK be the SFPK public key of the user chosen in the previous game. We now instead of using pk SFPK to create pk * SFPK , we use a fresh key generated using KGen SFPK .
We will now show that any adversary A that can distinguish those games, can be used to brake the weak class-hiding of the SFPK scheme. We will show how to build a reduction R that does this. Let (sk 0 SFPK , pk 0 SFPK ), (sk 1 SFPK , pk 1 SFPK ) and pk ′ SFPK be the inputs given to R by the challenger in the adaptive class-hiding experiment. The reduction then sets pk 0 SFPK as the i-th honest user SFPK public key. All other key material for those users is constructed as described in the scheme. Now in order to answer the query (info * τ , uid * 1 , uid * 2 , m * ) to the Chall b oracle, the reduction: sets pk * SFPK = pk ′ SFPK , computes σ * SPS as in GAME 3 , computes Π * SFPK as in GAME 2 , computes c * SFPK ← $ PKE.Enc(pk ′ SFPK , tpk), asks its signing oracle for Sig * SFPK under message m * ||τ * ||pk * SFPK ||σ * SPS ||Π * SFPK || c * SFPK , and returns Σ * = (pk * SFPK , σ * SPS , Π * SFPK , c * SFPK , Sig * SFPK ). Note that since it knows sk 0 SFPK and sk 1 SFPK it can easily answer all corruption queries made by A. In the end A outputs a bit b, which is also returned by R. It follow that we have |Pr[S 6 ] − Pr[S 5 ]| ≤ Adv c-h A,SFPK (λ).
We now argue that the only way the adversary A can break anonymity is by creating a randomization
of the signature Σ * = (pk * SFPK , σ * SPS , Π * SFPK , c * SFPK , Sig * SFPK ) and use Σ ′ in a query to the Trace oracle. Since in GAME 5 we changed the public key pk * SFPK to a random one, this is the only part of the simulation, where the adversary can notice something. Thus, for this to work the adversary must use a valid signature Sig ′ SFPK for pk ′ SFPK ∈ [pk * SFPK ] R . We distinguish two cases: Sig ′ SFPK = Sig * SFPK and Sig ′ SFPK Sig * SFPK . If Sig ′ SFPK = Sig * SFPK this means that pk ′ SFPK = pk * SFPK and either σ ′ SPS σ * SPS or Π ′ SFPK Π * SFPK . Since pk * SFPK is set to random public key in GAME 6 we can use an adversary that creates such a signature Σ ′ to break strong existential unforgeability of the SFPK scheme. In case Sig ′ SFPK Sig * SFPK , we notice that in order for the adversary to see that this is a simulation the public key pk ′ SFPK must be in relation to pk * SFPK . Thus, we can again use the adversary to break the strong existential unforgeability of the SFPK scheme, even if σ ′ SPS = σ * SPS , Π ′ SFPK = Π * SFPK and pk ′ SFPK = pk * SFPK . In other words, the only way the adversary can randomize the challenged signature is by randomizing the SFPK signature because the other values are signed. However, since the scheme is strongly unforgeable the adversary has negligible chances to do so. It follows that Pr[S 6 ] = Adv seuf−cma A,SFPK (λ). In the end we have:
Theorem 4 (Traceability). Our construction is traceable if the SPS-EQ scheme is existential unforgeable under chosen-message attacks, the SFPK scheme is existential unforgeable and the signature scheme used by the Issuer is existential unforgeable under chosenmessage attacks.
Theorem 5 (Non-frameability). Our construction is non-frameable if the SFPK scheme is existential unforgeable and the proof system used by the tracing authority is sound.
Theorem 6 (Functional Tracing Soundness). Our construction has functional tracing soundness if the underlying SFPK scheme has canonical representatives, the proof system used by the Judge is sound and the proof system used by the signers is a proof of knowledge.
The full proofs for theorems 4, 5 and 6 can be found in [6] .
DISCUSSION AND EFFICIENT INSTANTIATION
The generic construction presented above can be easily instantiated in the standard model, without random oracles, using known schemes. In particular, we can use the standard model signatures on equivalence classes by Fuchsbauer and Gay [31] and one of the compatible SFPK signature schemes by Backes et al. [5] . For the encryption scheme one can use El Gamal encryption and standard model digital signatures. Finally, both proof systems can be instantiated using the simulation-sound system by Groth [34] . However, due to the simulation-sound proof system and the large public keys of the SFPK schemes, the signature size is not competitive with existing schemes. We will now show how to minimize the signature size, while still using only building blocks that are secure under standard assumptions and without random oracles. The objective is to instantiate our construction in a way that it has shorter signatures than the current state-of-the-art scheme by Libert-Peters-Yung [45] presented at Crypto'15, which is only secure in a weaker model.
Optimization. To decrease the signature size we have to solve the following problems:
(1) The proof system Π GS.Trace must allow the security reduction for the anonymity experiment to simulate the challenged proof and at the same time extract witnesses to properly simulate the Trace oracle, First, we replace the simulation-sound system with a simple NIWI proof system. In fact, we instantiate all building blocks such that we can use the popular Groth-Sahai proofs for pairing product equations. To do so, we introduce a trapdoor witness that can be used by the reduction to simulate the proof, while still being able to extract the witness. Of course, we have to prevent the adversary from using this trapdoor to create valid proofs. We achieve this by introducing a new element K 2 = д k 2 as part of the groups public key that will be part of the statement. The trapdoor witness are then two values w 1 and w 2 , such that e(w 1 , K 2 ) = e(w 2 , д 2 ). It is easy to see that any adversary that is able to compute such a witness can be used to break the DDH assumption in G 2 .
To solve the second problem we propose an SFPK scheme that works analogously to the schemes presented in [5] , but allows us to use canonical representatives by moving to our weaker classhiding definition. The scheme uses public keys in G 1 × G 1 with the established projective equivalence relation, i.e. pk ∈ [pk ′ ] R if there is a µ ∈ Z * p such that pk µ 1 = pk ′ 1 and pk µ 2 = pk ′ 2 . For such classes of public keys, we define the canonical representative as the public key for which the first element is just д 1 . We give a full SFPK scheme based on this approach and secure under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in Section 6.
To simplify the statement proven in Π GS.Trace , we get rid of the ciphertext c SFPK , that is used by the tracing authority to identify signers. To preserve this functionality, we allow the tracing authority to generate the parameters for the proof system Π GS.Trace , including an extraction trapdoor which allows to extract the used witness and compute the corresponding canonical representative.
When applying all the above techniques the statement proven by the signer will have the form:
∃ (pk SFPK , r, w 1 , w 2 ) s. t.
SFPK.ChgPK(pk SFPK , r ) = pk ′ SFPK ∧ IsCanonical(pk SFPK ) ∨ e(w 1 , K 2 ) = e(w 2 , д 2 ).
The construction and proofs can be found in the full paper [6] .
Efficiency of the Instantiation. The signature itself is composed of an SFPK public key pk ′ SFPK , an SFPK signature Sig SFPK , an SPS-EQ signature σ ′ SPS and proof Π SFPK . To instantiate SFPK signatures we use Scheme 5, which means that pk ′ SFPK is 2 elements in G 1 and Sig SFPK is 2 elements in G 1 , 1 in G 2 and 1 in Z * p . Similar to the static group signature in [5] , we will instantiate the SPS-EQ with the scheme from [31] . This means that the SPS-EQ signature takes 10 elements in G 1 and 4 elements in G 2 .
Taking into account that we will use Scheme 5, the above statement can instantiated as follows. Let pk ′ SFPK = (pk ′ 1 , pk ′ 2 ) and pk SFPK = (pk 1 , pk 2 ), we can then express this proof by the pairing product equations: e(w 1 , K 2 ) = e(w 2 , д 2 ) and e(pk ′ 1 , д r −1 2 ) = e(д 1 , д 2 ) · e(w 1 , д 2 ). It is easy to see that the witness (r , w 1 , w 2 ) = (0, (д 1 ) −1 , (K 1 ) −1 ) is a trapdoor witness that can be used in the security proof to create a valid proof for an arbitrary pk ′ SFPK . The canonical representative pk SFPK is only used by the tracing authority to open signatures. However, by extracting the witness R = д r −1 2 it can still do this because if pk ′ 2 = д x ·r 1 , then e(pk ′ 2 , R) = e(д x 1 , д 2 ) is a static value that is common for all public keys in relation with pk ′ SFPK . Since the tracing authority has access to the registration table that contains public keys in canonical form of active members it can correctly open signatures.
Instantiating those equations using the fine-tuned Groth-Sahai proofs presented in [30] (assuming decisional Diffie-Hellman), the proof size is 10 elements in G 1 and 8 elements in G 2 . This is constituted by: 2 group elements in G 2 for the first equation, which is linear; 4 elements in G 1 and G 2 for the second equation; 6 elements in G 1 for the three witnesses in G 1 ; 2 elements in G 2 for the witness r . Overall the group signature is composed of 28 elements in G 1 , 15 in G 2 and 1 in Z * p . The digital signature scheme DS and the public key encryption scheme PKE are standard components, an example of a key private PKE scheme is ElGamal encryption. The proof system Π GS.Judge can also be instantiated using Groth-Sahai proofs for pairing product equations [30] . Note that this means that the tracing authority has to prove correct decryption of a ciphertext (witnesses are encoded in form of El Gamal encryptions) and that its public key was generated using a DDH tuple, which can easily be expressed as pairing product equations.
We provide a comparison with existing group signature schemes in Figure 4 . We omit lattice-based schemes in our comparison, because the only constant-size scheme was proposed by Ling et al. [46] and as argued by the authors the size is impractical.
Comparison with Previous Constructions. Some of the techniques used in our construction are similar to the static group signatures by Backes et al. [5] and the dynamic group signatures presented by Derler and Slamanig [29] . In particular, we use signatures on equivalence classes as a certificate of membership. The latter uses signatures of knowledge to allow for traceability and to have an actual signature. Thus, their scheme can only be efficiently instantiated in the random oracle model, since standard model instantiations of proofs of knowledge of an exponent are logarithmic in the size of the exponent. The construction of Backes et al. uses SFPK signatures and standard proof systems like ours. In their scheme, the tracing authority uses the SFPK trapdoor to distinguish public key equivalence classes. Since their scheme is static, the issuer/tracing authority can obtain this trapdoor during user key generation. In the dynamic setting, where we want to achieve non-frameability, the members generate their keys themselves in an interactive protocol with the issuer, preventing this approach. We address this by introducing the canonical representative into the notion of SFPK signature. We then allow the tracing authority to check the randomized public key, given as part of the group signature, against the canonical representative used during the joining procedure.
Group Update and Signing Complexity. We will first focus on the computational complexity of the group manager in regards to adding/removing members. To add a new member the manager creates a SPS-EQ signature under the member's public key that acts as a kind of certificate. Furthermore it encrypts the random coins used to blind the member's public key. The signature and ciphertext are then added to the current epoch information. It is easy to see that the complexity of adding new users is constant in the number of active group members. By contrast, removing members requires an update of the whole epoch information, i.e. the group manager generates a fresh SPS-EQ public key and issues fresh certificates for each active member. From a practical point of view this trade-off is acceptable. In particular, we note that adding a new member is a process that requires the interaction between the group manager and the user, at least for the group manager to obtain the new member's public key. On the other hand, to revoke a member no interaction is required and the group manager can perform the operation offline. What is more, this process can be easily parallelized (each entry can be computed independently) and changes can be batched (removing more users can be done at once).
It is worth noting that linear complexity in the number of active members is not inherent for membership revocation, since one could use cryptographic accumulators [27] to store information about active members. In such a case the complexity of updates for the group manager would be linear only in the number of changes (additions/removes) and not in the number of active users.
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any construction that could utilize this idea without violating the membership privacy properties. Note that cryptographic accumulators require auxiliary information about the added/removed user to be published in order for the other members to be able to generate membership proofs for the new accumulator. This information could easily be used by an adversary to break membership privacy.
The form of the epoch information influences the complexity of the signing procedure. In our construction, the signer has to find the entry that corresponds to its identity in the current epoch. To simplify presentation we made this process linear in the number of active members. However, it is easy to see that this process need only be performed once per epoch, i.e. once a member updates their certificate it can be used to create all subsequent signatures by this member in the same epoch. In the current construction the epoch information is represented as a set but it can easily be represented as an ordered list. To facilitate this, the group manager can create unique identifiers that can be used to sort the list and members can find the correct entry using binary search. To preserve membership privacy, during registration members generate an additional public key for a key agreement scheme and store the private key securely. Each epoch the group manager also generates a fresh public key for the key agreement scheme and uses the shared key as a secret to generate the unique and hidden identifier, e.g. using a pseudorandom function. This identifier can easily be reconstructed by the corresponding member but is indistinguishable from a random value for all other members and third parties.
Hiding the Group Size. In this paper we do not consider the problem of hiding the group size but we show how it can be partially solved using dummy members and a trade-off in the group update complexity. Our current construction does not hide the size of the group, since the epoch information size is linear in the number of active group members. The simplest idea is to create the first epoch information with dummy users and update it with every addition/removing. It is easy to see that the size of the epoch information will be constant (during setup a maximal number of members has to be chosen) if we replace dummy members by real ones and vice versa. Unfortunately, this approach requires the whole epoch information to be updated for both addition and revocation of members and not only during the revocation of a member. It also leaks an upper bound on the group size and requires an update complexity that is at least linear in the number of active members. However, we argue that from a practical point of view using dummy users can be acceptable to protect the size of the group.
A different approach would be to again use cryptographic accumulators, since they can be constant size and independent of the number of accumulated values. Unfortunately, this solution is not better than the above one. To prove membership of a value in a new accumulator the witness corresponding to the previous state must be updated. Existing definitions and constructions of accumulators [27] require that the added/removed value must be used for this update. Thus, the epoch information must contain this value is some form (e.g. encrypted). However, in the end since this value must be part of the epoch information, an adversary can easily backtrack all previous published information and calculate the size of the group.
EFFICIENT SIGNATURES WITH FLEXIBLE PUBLIC KEY
Here we propose our signatures with flexible public key. We propose a scheme that is closely related to the ones proposed in [5] . However, security relies on the bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption instead of the decisional linear assumption. This allows us to decrease the size of the public key by 1 group element in G 1 , i.e. from 3 to 2. Unlike the schemes in [5] , this scheme only has class-hiding with key corruption but as already shown this is still sufficient for group signature constructions. We assume that both the SFPK.KGen and SFPK.TKGen output a public key that is the canonical representative of its equivalence class. Further we assume that every user has access to a collision resistant hash function H, which we express by including it in the output of SFPK.CRSGen. The SFPK.ChgPK and SFPK.ChgSK algorithms work by drawing uniformly at random an exponent r ∈ Z p and raising every component of the public key, or respectively the secret key to the power of r . More details can be found in Scheme 5.
Theorem 7 (Unforgeability). Scheme 5 is strongly existential unforgeable under flexible public key in the crs model, assuming the bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds and that PHF is a (1, poly(λ ))-programmable hash function and H is collision-resistant.
Proof. Let (Sig * SFPK , m * , pk * SFPK ) be the forgery returned by an adversary A, where Sig * SFPK = (Sig * 1 , Sig * 2 , Sig * 3 , s * ). We distinguish three types of strategies of the adversary:
Type 1 We call the adversary a type 1 adversary if there exists a public key pk SFPK and signature Sig SFPK = (Sig 1 SFPK.ChkRep(δ SFPK , pk SFPK ) pk SFPK = (pk 1 , pk 2 ); τ SFPK = (τ )
if e(pk 1 , τ ) = e(pk 2 , д 2 ) return 1 else 0 SFPK.KGen(1 λ )
x ← $ Z * p return (pk SFPK := (д 1 , д x 1 ), sk SFPK := (Y x 1 , pk SFPK )) SFPK.TKGen(1 λ )
x ← $ Z * p return (pk SFPK := (д 1 , д x 1 ), sk SFPK := (Y x 1 , pk SFPK ), τ SFPK := (д x 2 )) SFPK.Sign(sk SFPK , m) sk SFPK = (Z, pk SFPK ); (3) parse pk * SFPK , and since for a valid forgery we have pk * SFPK ∈ [pk SFPK ] R , we have pk * SFPK = (д t * 1 , (д b 1 ) t * ) and R can use д t * 1 , (4) output 1 iff e(д a ·b ·t * 1 , д c 2 ) = e(д t * 1 , д d 2 ). The probability that R successfully solves the bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman problem depends on the advantage of A and the probability that R's simulation succeeds. Since the programmable hash function PHF is (1, poly(λ ))-programmable and because this is a type 3 adversary, we conclude that this probability is non-negligible. Note that since in this case we use A 3 , M * is distinct from all M's used in O 1 and O 2 , which is not the case for type 1 and type 2 adversaries. □ Theorem 8 (Class-Hiding with Key Corruption). Scheme 5 is class-hiding with key corruption in the crs model, assuming the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds.
Proof. We start with GAME 0 which is the original class-hiding experiment and let S 0 be an event that the experiment evaluates to 1, i.e. the adversary wins. We will use S i to denote the event that the adversary wins the class-hiding experiment in GAME i .
Let pk SFPK = (A, B) be the public key given to the adversary, pk 0 = (A 0 , B 0 ) = (д 1 , д x 0 1 ) and pk 1 = (A 0 , B 1 ) = (д 1 , д x 1 1 ) be the public keys that are returned by SFPK.KGen, sk 0 = (Y x 0 1 , pk 0 ) and sk 1 = (Y x 1 1 , pk 1 ) the corresponding secret keys andb be the bit chosen by the challenger. GAME 1 : In this game we do not use the SFPK.ChgSK algorithm to compute sk SFPK and pk SFPK but compute them as pk SFPK = (Q, Q xb ), and sk SFPK = ((Q xb ) y , pk SFPK ), where Y 1 = д y 1 is part of the common reference string ρ generated by the challenger. In other words, instead of using the exponent r to randomize the public key and secret key, we use a group element Q to do it.
Since the distribution of the keys does not change, it follows that Pr[S 1 ] = Pr[S 0 ]. Note that the oracle can still use sk SFPK to compute valid signatures. GAME 1 : In this game instead of computing pk SFPK = (Q, Q xb ) as in GAME 1 , we sample B ′ ← $ G 1 and set pk SFPK = (Q, B ′ ).
We will show that this transition only lowers the adversaries advantage by a negligible fraction. This can be shown by construction using a reduction R that uses an adversary A that can distinguish between those two games to break the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in G 1 .
Let (д α 1 , д β 1 , д γ 1 ) be an instance of this problem in G 1 . R samples r 0 , r 1 ← $ Z * p and sets B 0 = (д α 1 ) r 0 , B 1 = (д α 1 ) r 1 . Note that in such a case, we also have to set sk 0 = ((B 0 ) y , pk 0 ) and sk 1 = ((B 1 ) y , pk 1 ). Additionally, the reduction uses Q = д β 1 and the public key pk SFPK = (Q, (д γ 1 ) rb ). Note that the reduction can use the secret key sk SFPK = (((д γ 1 ) rb ) y , pk SFPK ) to generate signatures and answer signing queries. Now γ = α · β then pk SFPK has the same distribution as in GAME 1 and otherwise as in GAME 2 . Thus, it follows that |Pr[S 2 ] − Pr[S 1 ]| ≤ Adv ddh A (λ).
We will now show that we have Pr[S 2 ] = 1 2 . This follow from the fact that we have pk SFPK = (Q, B ′ ) and signatures of the form Sig SFPK = ((B ′ ) y · (PHF.Eval(K PHF , m)) r , д r 1 , д r 2 , s) for some r ∈ Z * p and Q, B ′ , which are independent from the bitb. Thus, we have 
